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Figure 1: Analytical equations of a mass mounted on 
the robot endeffector as a multi-body system 
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Introduction 
This paper describes safety methods for collision detection for human- machine interaction with 
industrial robots. For interaction it is a requirement, that the components must be safe, which 
means safe in electrical and mechanical design the functional safety. We present one solution for 
collision detection for endeffector tools. The theoretical model of collision detection, signal time 
based detection and multi-body safety control is discussed for implementation on the basic 
electrical safe microcontroller board. The behavior of new mechanical tests for the closed safety 
loop is discussed in the opposite of control-loops without sensor based failure detection. The 
conclusion gives an outlook about the experimental results and the possibility of free human- 
machine interaction without fences. 
 
Theoretical model 
Sensor based collision detection algorithm uses multi-body Newton-Euler equations of motion to 
solve the relation between signals from a force-moment sensor, accelerometer and three 
angular-rate velocity sensors.  
The unbalance of the equation is then 
classified as external collision force 
CollisionF

 or collision moment CollisionM

. 
 
 If CollisionF

or CollisionM

exceeds the 
allowance preset the algorithm determine 
the collision is occurred. In figure 1, the 
mass represents the object which the 
robot holds, such as a machine tool. The 
mass is moveable in all possible 
directions of freedom so the reactive 
force is computed [6].  
The equation of motion is examined as: 
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Another safety feature is the model-based safety monitoring, which is established by system 
modeling and parameter identification of robot mechanism and its manipulators. Robot 
mechanism is definable using inverse kinematic. Together with modeling of robot manipulators, 
each non-linear three-phased permanent magnet synchronous motor (PSM) including Pulse-
Width-Modulator (PWM) is done. For PSM, the model is developed under field-oriented 
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Figure 3: On-line off-line robot control strategy with 
sensors-based collision detection and model-based 
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Figure 2: Complete dynamic structure model of 
industrial robot co-simulation with MSC.ADAMS 
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coordinate which is straightforward for moment and rotational speed defining. PSM and PWM 
work as modules and can be extended or recomposed to suit a further application. Every model 
parameters, such as robot geometry, electrical properties of PSM and PWM are identified and 
finally give a complete robot model in figure 3. The model takes the trajectory of the real robot 
and computes every state variable in manipulators. This complete model is usable as a module 
for inverse kinematic and state observer or safety monitoring for each manipulator.  
Figure 2 concludes this work with “on-line off-line robot control strategy with sensors-based 
collision detection and model-based safety monitoring”. The structure of control strategy is 
extended from conventional on-line off-line robot control, which compensates only the task 
handling accuracy. Two safety 
features are incorporated into the 
off-line robot control loop. The 
sensors-based collision detection is 
dedicated for protecting the object 
surrounding the robot, such as 
human from damage by the robot in 
case of collision. Whereas the 
model-based safety monitoring 
observe the internal state variables 
of each manipulators, this predicts a 
malfunction occurs to the robot 
during operation by examine the 
difference of electrical voltages and 
currents of both the model ones and 
real ones, thus the robot is self 
failure detectable and prevent the 
damage widen from itself to the 
surrounding.  
Additional safety features complete 
control strategy by utilizing well-
known task handling capability of 
the conventional control and also 
another control procedure 
regarding safety [1], [2]. In case of 
robot end effector collides with 
nearby object or a malfunction in 
manipulators occurs, the control 
strategy introduced in this work 
should correctly detect and react by 
give a control signal to control each 
manipulators. This concludes and 
brings a step closer [3], [4], [5] to allow 
an industrial robot to perform at its maximum ability, while maintains a satisfactory level of safety.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Safety test path for 
mechanical system components 
Figure 5: Parallel monitoring of a robot 
Background of demand for mechanical parts tests in safety systems 
Applications for human-machine interaction demand sensors to measure the force or 
acceleration. This mechanical system has the advantage, that they obtain the interaction 
between the process and a collision with a human body. But without any information of the 
mechanical stress and sensor measurement, it is not possible to say, that the sensor works 
correct. Therefore a mechanical test control loop is needed. Mechanical signals are possible to 
insert by a lot of actuators e.g. excenter, shaker, piezo actuator and so on. With this actuator it is 
possible to put defined mechanical stress into mechanical elements with a constant square 
based force behavior. The stresstime should be very low (in microseconds), that this mechanical 
test does not disturb the normal operation conditions of the mechanical parts. Figure 4 shows the 
possibility to test online mechanical parts of 
systems and to examine the transfer function of this 
mechanical part plus the sensor function. Then the 
whole safety chain is tested. Furthermore the 
mechanical tests use the elastic behaviour of the 
used part, that no abnormal condition could be 
appearing. 
To analyse and to create defined process 
parameters, which will be observed during the 
process, the correlation between sensor signals of 
the actuator and the sensor could be used. With 
this information, the frequency transmission thru 
mechanical multi- body parts could be computed. 
Thus, the cross correlation function is a good tool, 
to examine the relation between the transfer function. This is computed by equation (2) with the 
inverse of the Fourier transformation of the cross power spectrum. 
( ) 2( ) j fxy XYR S f e dfpi ττ
∞
−∞
= ⋅          (2) 
If a correlation appears around 1, it is possible to examine the same signal behaviour in the 
original and the compare signal. With a monitoring system in the frequency range, it is possible to 
put a square impulse to the actuator, transfer thru the mechanical system, and read it back by the 
sensors. Therefore the result is information about the frequency hopping and amplitude of the 
transfer function.  
With the analysing method of the correlation it is possible to understand the frequency 
transmission thru multi body systems like in this application, mechanical motor part, crank, screw 
and force moment sensor. It is also possible with this method, to use actuators like piezoelectric 
components for thin film actuation to initiate force and moment signals in mechanical parts.  
 
Signal based collision detection for industrial robots with internal robot data 
Signal monitoring is a method adapted for 
collision detection. However a robot model makes 
sense for the monitoring of the robot kinematics. 
Both methods can be used parallel and give a 
reaction signal as shown in figure 5. The major 
difference of both methods is the measurement of 
external sensor signals and internal signals of the 
robot control, which can be readout over the 
Profibus. A force- moment sensor and an 
acceleration sensor are mounted at the end-
effector as external sensors. At first both 
procedures are tested offline with a sample 
process (trajectory) in Matlab. Later the procedures can be implemented on a safety micro 
processor for online verification.  
The method of the signal monitoring is divided in three phases: the learning phase, the 
monitoring phase and the adaptation phase. Time and statistical thresholds will be built in the 
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Figure 6: Signal windowing, computing statistical 
thresholds and monitoring 
learning phase. In the monitoring phase the measurement is checked that the values are inside 
of the upper und lower thresholds.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 shows the collision detection with thresholds in the time domain (left) and statistical 
thresholds (right). The thresholds in the time domain are built with eq. (3) 
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There is )(iYG  the built upper and lower threshold, )(iY the measured value, σ  the standard 
deviation and µ  the mean value of the process, w  as a weighting factor.  
A new approach for making method of the signal monitoring more robust is to build statistical 
thresholds through signal windowing. The time span of this signal window is defined by the 
developer and is addicted of the sample rate and the number of measured values. The example 
in figure 6 has a time span of 10ms with sample rate of 10Khz. Subsequent a window histogram 
is generated with the measured values in every window. The histogram gets a defined number of 
discrete classes with a set frequency. The lower und upper statistical thresholds are built with 
add und remove a defined frequency in every class (figure 6 right). The frequency of the 
measured values has to be inside of the statistical thresholds. In figure 6 a collision was detected 
after 9ms, because the measurement exceeds the statistical thresholds and in the time domain.  
If the measurement is error-free, because there is no collision in the process, both thresholds will 
be adapted in the adaptation phase. The adaptation of the thresholds in the time domain occurs 
with eq. (5) 
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Similarly the statistical thresholds will be adapted. Overall the method of the signal monitoring 
with time and statistical could be suitable for collision detection.  
To build a model of the kinematics is another method for monitoring a robot. This model is built in 
Matlab and gets internal signals of the robot control. 
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Figure 7: Principals of monitoring the kinematics 
Figure 8: Residual of a link position 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7 shows the two principals of monitoring the robot kinematics. First the forward kinematics 
can be calculated from the reference link position as input values. Second the inverse kinematics 
can be calculated from the reference pose of the endeffector. The outputs can be compared with 
the position and pose of the real robot. If the residual is outside of a tolerance band, the robot will 
be stopped.  
 
 
 
Figure 8 (left) shows e.g. the time signal of the model and the real joint 5 when the robot moves. 
Model and real robot agree in together. Figure 8 (right) shows the residual of the joint position 
after calculating the inverse kinematics. Also there are marked some values. At these points the 
Jacobian trends against zero and the residuals get higher. But the residuals are small enough to 
be inside of a pre-defined tolerance band. 
For the other links, similar results are achieved. So the method of monitoring the kinematics can 
be taken to detect variations between model and reality. This, as a result, provides two safety 
features; sensors based collision detection of the robot to its working environment and a model-
based safety monitoring. Theses are extendable to be part of the robot control loop by mean of 
safety rather than just accuracy of task handling in conventional control strategy. 
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Figure 9: Safety microcontroller board and 
structure of safety microcontroller board (SMB) 
 
Figure 10: Allocation of failure rates 
 
Electronic Componts for safety collision detection 
Safety Microcontroller Board (SMB) is a device that is used to prevent risk in human and 
industrial robots cooperation. SMB consists of three parts; dual microcontroller, A/D Converter, 
and Fail Safe Logic (FSL). SMB is developed by using the structure known as “one out of two 
diagnoses (1oo2)”. The Safety Integrity Level (SIL) of SMB is rated by Hardware Failure 
Tolerance (HFT) method, which indicates that all electronic components must be separated to 
several failure rates λ (Figure 10). Consequently, Diagnostic-Coverage (DC) and Safe Failure 
Fraction (SFF) values can be calculated by the equations provided below [7], [8], [9]. SIL value 
can be identified by comparison SFF value to the SIL classification table in the industry standard 
IEC 61508 (functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety-related) [13]. 
As a result, SIL of SMB is classified as SIL3. As tested by simulation of collision, SMB’s operation 
is able to judge any situation and OSSD signal is send, whenever the collisions appear.  
These SMB is in use for three different ways. The 
first is test the calculation of equation 1 during the 
movement of the robot. If a collision appears, the 
SMB send a signal directly to the robot controller 
to stop the robot. The second way is to use the 
internal robot signals e.g. motor current for an 
independent collision control. The third way is to 
calculate the kinematics and the robot dynamics 
as shown in figure 8. If any variant appear 
between the internal robot data and the external 
kinematic computed on the SMB, the robot will 
stop the production procedure.  
DD
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

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S D
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 
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        (9) 
The structure of SMB is shown in figure 9. The components inside a dash box are identified as a 
safety zone, which must not be broken down when there is a failure from the outside. Twelve 
signals from three separated parts; a force- moment sensor, accelerometer, and an angular-
velocity sensor of robot end effector, are converted to 8bits digital data and transferred to 
microcontroller by using Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI). 
Each of the microcontroller receives the same data from 
A/D converter, in spite of the algorithms are different. 
Therefore a collision at robot end effector is guaranteed. 
Whenever the collision appears, both output logical signals 
from microcontrollers must be sent to FSL. Consequently, 
they are compared by logical gate in FSL section and will be 
converted to 24V level for OSSD signal which can stop the 
robot from collision [10]. 
According to the important role of FSL in termination of a 
collision, all electronic components in this section must be 
inspected. The inspection can be performed by using a test 
impulse signal; the red dash line in figure 9 is the 
inspection path. The test impulse signal is generated from any of the microcontrollers [11], [12]. If 
all elements in FSL still operate, the other microcontroller should get the same test impulse 
signal. It should be considered that the test impulse signal must be faster than the sensitivity of 
PLC. Otherwise, it will be recognized and disturb the PLC’s program. As tested by simulation of 
collision, SMB’s operation is able to judge any situation and OSSD signal is send, whenever the 
collisions with mechanical parts appear. 
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Figure 11: Mechanical tests thru stimulated actuator test frequencies, first harmonic vibration 
of one eccentricity; the correlation factor between the sensor force and induced acceleration. 
Figure 12: Free human- robot  
cooperation 
 
Experimental results 
As written down in chapter “tests for mechanical parts in safety systems”, it is necessary to use 
identification procedures to test the mechanical system with test impulses which are created by 
an actuator. Then the used sensor is able to replay this test signal and the correlation between 
the actuation signal and the sensor signal decides how the safety chain works. As an example, 
figure 11 shows the possibility to examine the correctness of the sensor system. One DC drive 
powers a shaft with a torque and the shaft begins to rotate with the rotating frequency. That 
eccentricity results a vibration which is transferred over the screw terminal to the force moment 
sensor. After an analysis of the sensor signals, the correlation is high between the acceleration 
inducted by the vibration and the important force signal. This shows figure 11 where, for example 
the second order vibration is printed isolated. Furthermore, an amplitude modulation is induced 
by the test signal. This could be shown by the sidebands in the frequency area.  
 
 
As a result, with this method it is possible to test a lot of mechanical parts e.g. sensors by 
induced mechanical stress. Furthermore it is possible to decide, when a sensor failed and when 
this sensor have to create a warning message or the underlying safety management system 
initiate a stop of the movement of the robot controller. 
 
Conclusion  
The aim of this research activities is enable an industrial robot cooperation and to be able to 
capable a handling of a massive high temperature metal 
forming process.  
A new approach to identify collisions during work together with 
industrial robots is used. The theoretical background is 
described as collision detection with external force moment 
sensors. If it’s possible to use the internal robot data, it is 
possible to use the described signal processing algorithms 
with time based monitoring or with statistical monitoring of e.g. 
motor currents. For detection of variations and errors of the 
robot controller, a multi-body system controller was 
described. This controller recognizes unconditional 
behaviors and forces the robot controller to stop with a safety 
PLC. To implement this software, a safety microcontroller 
board was developed and approved. Therefore, a safety integrated level development was used. 
To fulfill the requirements of a full safety chain, the method of integration test signals in 
mechanical components is described, which closed the requirements of a full safety chain. Now it 
is possible, to solve the challenge of human- machine interaction without fences and to improve 
production with a free cooperation. 
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